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LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION (Princeton
Univ. Press, 2006) AND OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL:
DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (New York Univ.
Press, 2005)
Reviewed by Paul Schiff Berman*

THE ENDURING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE
In an era of globalization, “culture’’ is sometimes treated as a
dirty word. For those who see the world as increasingly “flat,”1
culture can seem to be merely a retrograde imposition of local
prerogative that stands in the way of progress.2 Likewise, those who
seek greater harmonization of human rights norms, commercial
trade rules, or other legal standards may view culture as simply a
monkey wrench in the machinery of global consensus and
cooperation.3 In such debates, culture is often conceptualized as
fundamentally pre-modern, something “they” cling to, but that “we”
have long since jettisoned.4
Dean and Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University. I owe thanks to Gosia Zawislak for editorial and research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Harrison, Introduction: Why Culture Matters, in
CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS xxi (Lawrence E.
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000) (“A growing number of scholars,
journalists, politicians, and development practitioners are focusing on the role of
cultural values and attitudes as facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress.”); Pratibha
Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice: The Impact of Protecting
Multiculturalism on Women’s Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 201, 207
(2005) (“We ought to ensure that multiculturalist notions conform to universal
human rights norms . . . .”); cf. Jean-Michel Servais, Universal Labor Standards and
National Cultures, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 35, 47 (2004) (criticizing the notion
“that some cultures are more open to progress than others [and] that cultural
diversity will inevitably lead to opposition on questions of values and even
constitutes an obstacle to development” but acknowledging the premise “that being
too respectful of national considerations can lead to failure”).
3. See, e.g., José A. Laínez & Mar Gasca, Obstacles to the Harmonisation
Process in the European Union: The Influence of Culture, 3 INT’L J. ACCOUNTING,
AUDITING
&
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
68
(2006),
available
at
http://inderscience.metapress.com/media/mftkvluwmj1d367rvvtk/contributions/3/1/a/
t/31at8fuht2tja3xt.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Mary Douglas, Traditional Culture—Let’s Hear No More About It,
in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 85, 87 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds.,
2004) (describing belief of development economists that “something called ‘culture’ is
*
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Two recent books—Law as Culture by Lawrence Rosen and
Law, Culture, and Ritual by Oscar Chase—provide a welcome
response to this “anti-culture” bias. Both works point to the enduring
claims of culture as the necessary and inevitable mechanism by
which human beings construct meaning out of reality. Indeed, the
capacity for culture is seen as a crucial part of our very evolution as
a species.5 Thus, culture is not simply a set of customs we can choose
to put on or take off like clothing; it is woven into the fabric of our
being. Accordingly, cosmopolitans no less than localists are using
cultural categories, reflecting cultural assumptions, and betraying
cultural presuppositions.
Moreover, as both books make clear, law and culture cannot be
disentangled. Rather, as Rosen points out, “law is so deeply
embedded in the particularities of each culture that carving it out as
a separate domain and only later making note of its cultural
connections distorts the nature of both law and culture” (Rosen, p.
xii). From this perspective, we must not see law as simply an
autonomous system of rules that regulates disputes. Law is instead
constitutive of how members of a society envision themselves and
their relations to each other. 6
Because of the ongoing importance of culture, we should not be
surprised that efforts to harmonize both substantive norms and
procedural systems run into difficulty on the ground. This is not
news to comparative lawyers, of course, given their consistent efforts
to conceptualize and categorize differences among legal systems. Yet,
the adversary of rational economic behavior, and that ‘traditional culture’ [is] holding
the poor nations back from development”); Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION (1995), http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm (contrasting universal
human rights, conceptualized as “a modern achievement, new to all cultures” with
“traditional culture,” which may not effectively provide such rights).
5. See Rosen at 3: “[Human beings’] categorizing capacity—the key feature of
the concept of ‘culture’—was not something that happened after we became human
but something that actually preceded our present speciation. Thus, the acquisition of
the capacity for culture, through the selective advantage it offered, contributed
enormously to our evolution into homo sapiens.”
6. This perspective echoes the formulation of Clifford Geertz:
[L]aw, rather than a mere technical add-on to a morally (or immorally)
finished society, is, along of course with a whole range of other cultural
realities . . . an active part of it. . . . Law . . . is, in a word, constructive; in
another, constitutive; in a third, formational.
....
. . . Law, with its power to place particular things that happen . . . in a general
frame in such a way that rules for the principled management of them seem to
arise naturally from the essentials of their character, is rather more than a
reflection of received wisdom or a technology of dispute settlement.

Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 218,
230 (1983).
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even for them these books are likely to be useful, in that they offer a
richly textured analysis of culture as the driving force behind this
inevitable legal pluralism.7 And while neither book really tackles the
ultimate questions of how best to design legal institutions,
procedural mechanisms, or discursive practices to manage this
pluralism, they do make it clear that assuming cultural
considerations out of the equation is simply not an option. This
insight alone makes these books a welcome addition to the legal
literature.
*

*

*

In order to discuss two books centered on law and culture, we
need at least a working approximation of what we (or at least Rosen
and Chase) mean by the word “culture.” Not surprisingly, defining
“culture” is a complicated task. Indeed, scholars have long wrestled
with this definitional question, and there is no necessary agreement
on what the term encompasses.8 Yet, both Rosen and Chase appear
to adopt a relatively similar understanding. In their view culture is
far more than items of culture as understood in common vernacular,
for example when we talk about “arts and culture.” Thus, culture is
not limited to film, theater, clothing, and exotic rituals and customs.
Instead, culture is seen as an entire cosmology. In Rosen’s terms,
culture is the “capacity for creating the categories of our experience”
(Rosen, p. 4). From this more expansive perspective, culture can be
understood first to be the glue that binds together the various
domains of human life: economics, kinship, politics, and law. (Id.)
Second, culture is the force that causes the collective experience of a
group to be “not only logical and obvious but immanent and natural.”
(Id.) Thus, culture is the way in which “we create our experience,
knit together disparate ideas and actions, and in the process
fabricate a world of meaning that appears to us as real.” (Id.) Using
this definition of culture, we can more easily see its inextricable
linkage with law as part of the process of meaning-making.
*

*

*

7. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988).
There is, of course, an increasingly rich literature on legal pluralism in the
international and transnational arena. See Berman, supra, at 1157-59 nn. 2-7 and
accompanying text (summarizing literature).
8. See, e.g., RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 87 (rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1983) (noting that “[c]ulture is one of the
two or three most complicated words in the English language”).
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Having established a working understanding of culture, we are
now better positioned to appreciate the central themes of the two
books. Turning first to Rosen, Law as Culture functions as an
elegantly short and clear introduction to, and summation of, some of
the core concepts that have animated his important body of scholarly
work. Strolling casually across a range of cultural contexts, Rosen
looks for certain common issues that he argues all legal systems
must address. He identifies four in particular. First he emphasizes
the way in which “social control is fabricated through a mix of
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ mechanisms” (Rosen, p. 8). Second, he
considers how “facts are created for purposes of addressing
differences and rendering the process of determining truth and
consequences consistent with common sense.” (Id.) Third, he links
law’s reasoning process with the style of reasoning deployed
elsewhere in the culture. (Id.) This linkage allows us to see how law
both reflects and helps construct broader patterns of logic and
rationality for the community. And finally, Rosen identifies law’s
role in helping to “create a sense of an orderly universe well beyond
its role in addressing whatever disputes may arise” (Rosen, pp. 8-9).
These four attributes of law then provide the organizational
framework for the book, as Rosen devotes one chapter to each.
Rosen not only identifies these four roles, but also argues that
these roles (though of course not the way the roles are played out)
are common across legal systems (Rosen, p. 8). This turns out to be
crucial to his project, because he is seeking to steer a course between
the vain search for universals, on the one hand, and the reification of
the particular, on the other. Indeed, to the extent that
anthropologists often seem to insist upon cultural specificity and the
distinctiveness of individual cultures, Rosen rejects such work as “an
exercise in butterfly collecting” (Rosen, p. 12). Thus, he is, perhaps
surprisingly, not interested in cataloging the ways in which culture x
does things this way and culture y does things that way. Instead, he
appears to see the anthropologist’s role as one that tries to identify
common conceptual problems across cultures, problems that are
addressed in many different ways, but that are nevertheless
amenable to some universal generalizations.
It is possible, of course, to quibble with Rosen’s attempted
middle-ground position between the universal and the particular.
One might, for example, think that, by seeking to identify common
conceptual problems across all legal systems, he is imposing a kind
of conceptual universalism. On this view, what Rosen derides as
butterfly collecting might actually be a wise acknowledgment that
not just the answers but the very questions a legal system is asked
to solve are culturally distinct.
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to dispute that Rosen’s

SSRN-ID1409294-15/25/2009 10:11 AM

2009]

B O O K R E V I E WS

105

approach yields important insights that are helpful in understanding
most (even if possibly not all) legal systems. For example, he argues
persuasively that law encompasses a continuum of formal and
informal structures and that the seemingly more “official” forms of
law cannot be understood separately from the broad range of social
control mechanisms (Rosen, p. 15). Thus, as in Stewart Macaulay’s
well-known study of American business behavior, even such a
seemingly legalistic realm as contract law often operates more as a
way of clarifying expectations and cementing relationships—
particularly among those who see themselves as repeat players—
than as setting the stage for a breach of contract lawsuit.9 Moreover,
it may be that the fear of losing these relationships functions as a
much greater potential sanction than the fear of being sued. Thus,
“[i]n even so ‘legalistic’ an environment as contract law. . .it is the
full array of social control mechanisms that informs the meaning
and applicability of the law and the role it plays in the broader
process of exchange” (Rosen, p. 15).
Not only must law be seen as encompassing this web of formal
and informal sanctions, but also, according to Rosen, we need to see
it in terms of both imposing order and creating flexibility (Rosen, pp.
22-23). This again is counter to the way we often conceive of law. In
Rosen’s framework, cultures create a balance between “the order law
seeks and the open-endedness that life requires to fashion a world
that. . .gives order and flexibility to individuals and groups alike”
(Rosen, p. 23). Accordingly, law lives entwined with culture, and we
need to look at the panoply of formal and informal systems in order
to see that, as with the contractual relations Macaulay identified,
dispute resolution is only one part of a larger system that needs to
create a sense of orderliness, while still preserving options for future
relations. On this view, even a seemingly inflexible legal command
such as an eye for an eye may be seen as a “structured limitation on
potentially escalating violence” and therefore a means of preserving
future relations (Rosen, p. 22).
Rosen also argues provocatively about the ways in which law
creates facts. The verb in that phrase is, of course, crucial, as Rosen
believes that law does not simply adjudicate pre-existing facts, but
rather constructs what we understand to be the relevant details of a
dispute. He notes that, even when there is little dispute about the
events that have occurred, “something must first be regarded as a
fact if it is to count as such” (Rosen, pp. 68-69). For example, we may
think that honesty is best revealed through demeanor, or instead we
9. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963); see also Stewart Macaulay, Freedom from
Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 777 (updating and
expanding the analysis).
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may think it best understood through examining a witness’ kinship
network. Likewise, someone’s socioeconomic background may be
deemed relevant to understanding intent or it may be deemed
irrelevant. And, of course, a legal system may define the boundaries
of a case broadly or narrowly, to include a whole range of
interactions among the parties and their families over time, or as a
completely distinct single act to be adjudicated in isolation from any
other.
To explore this idea of fact creation and definition, Rosen tours
across a broad landscape of U.S., English, Continental, Japanese,
and Arab case studies past and present. He begins by recounting the
lengthy history of the development of the English jury, as contrasted
with the development of fact-finding on the European continent
(Rosen, pp. 70-88). This history charts how continental and English
systems responded to the Lateran Council of 1215, which removed
priests from the administration of ordeals.10 In place of this divine
intervention, legal systems were forced to create new finders of fact:
in England, juries; on the continent, judges steeped in the law of the
Church. A second example for Rosen is the development of legal
conceptions of probability in the seventeenth century. Here he traces
the ways in which notions of probability evolved “[a]s the Protestant
Reformation took hold, as science struggled with levels of certainty,
and as standards for grading moral acts diversified” (Rosen, p. 88).
Next, Rosen elaborates on his notion of how evidentiary rules reflect
and reinforce cultural assumptions by describing some of the more
bizarre facets of American evidence law—for example, are people
really more likely to tell the truth while dying or while very excited
than in other contexts?—and then contrasting the U.S. rules with
the presuppositions underlying Japanese and Arab evidentiary rules
(Rosen, pp. 94-105). He notes the more rigidly hierarchical nature of
Japanese society and ties this cultural form to the use of compulsory
conciliation and apology for resolving legal disputes. As Rosen points
out, “conciliation forces higher-ranking persons to honor their
obligations, allows people a clear acknowledgment of their rank, and
encourages extralegal pressures” (Rosen, p. 97). Turning to Arab
courts, Rosen points out that because a person is identified largely in
terms of those with whom he or she has established bonds of
indebtedness (Rosen, p. 98), it is not surprising that rules of
relevance are far looser, allowing a judge to take into account a much
broader set of relationships than would be typical in a U.S. court. As
Rosen notes, “What an Arab judge deems indispensable a British or
American judge is cautioned to ignore” (Rosen, p. 100). Finally,
Rosen turns to the ways in which evidentiary rules reflect

10. For Rosen’s account of this history, see pp. 79-80.
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conceptions of the Self, ideas about expertise, and other cultural
conceptions. For example, because Arab cosmology assumes inner
states such as intent are discoverable through a person’s
relationships and external acts, inquiries about past associations
and social background are deemed relevant (Rosen, p. 110).
Similarly, local experts who know the social interactions are
welcomed, while U.S. courts, in contrast, have come increasingly to
rely on experts possessing institutional stature rather than personal
connections (Rosen, p. 125).
In the final two sections of the book, Rosen turns to more
abstract issues of metaphor and cosmology. He argues, as others
have,11 that law is steeped in the metaphors we use to understand
human behavior and interaction (Rosen, pp. 131-39). Further, he
suggests that cultures have reasoning styles, which also play out in
legal rules (Rosen, pp. 139-45). Even the very idea of precedent is
suffused with a conception of time as linear and progressive. As to
cosmology, Rosen argues for the important role of law in maintaining
a culture’s experience of the world “as a unified and sensible whole”
(Rosen, p. 171). Moreover, he goes further and suggests that “the
predominant point of some legal systems may be the maintenance of
cosmological sense rather than ‘practical’ dispute resolution” (Rosen,
p. 175).
All of this makes for an entertaining introduction to the
interaction of law and anthropology. Indeed, though none of the
insights contained here is particularly new to anthropology (and
Rosen himself has trod similar ground in his previous work),12 this
book is a lovely and easy-to-read entering point into the variety of
ways law and culture intermix. As such, its ideal audience is,
perhaps, lawyers who have a comparative bent but who do not have
much detailed background on the deep relationship of law and
culture.
Even given Rosen’s obvious decision to be a bit more breezy and
introductory in this book, one could still quibble with just how breezy
it is. Thus, as discussed above, Rosen frequently generalizes about
“Arab” legal systems, without providing any differentiation among
different subsets of “Arab.” Similarly, his various other legal
classifications—continental systems, common law systems, Japanese
systems, Cheyenne systems, and so on—have a tendency to feel a bit
schematic and lacking sufficient nuance. Nevertheless, Rosen offers
enough detail to make his key points, and of course the breeziness of
his book is one of its strengths; the book is an easy read, and that is
11. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
(2000); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
12. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS
CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989).
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great praise for a work as serious-minded and thoughtful as this.
*

*

*

Oscar Chase’s book is focused less on the general cosmology of
law than on the specific issue of dispute resolution processes. Yet,
like Rosen, Chase argues for the deep connection between culture
and disputing. Moreover, perhaps because Chase is a law professor
rather than an anthropologist, he takes an additional step and
attempts to draw normative conclusions from this core observation.
Thus, he suggests that “[t]he recognition and understanding of this
relationship [between culture and disputing] will enrich our capacity
to evaluate recommendations for change—particularly when they
involve borrowing from other societies” (Chase, p. 2).
Chase starts, like Rosen, with what some might term a
“primitive” dispute system; in this case the example is the Azande of
Central Africa (Chase, pp. 15-29). Here, it is easy to see how dispute
institutions are culturally embedded and play a role in
disseminating (and of course shaping) cultural values, beliefs, and
social arrangements. Next, Chase turns to the dispute resolution
processes of modern industrialized societies, arguing that here too,
no less than for the Azande, dispute resolution is a culturally
inflected process (Chase, pp. 30-46). Indeed, echoing Rosen’s
argument about fact creation rather than fact discovery, Chase
contends that rules of law and evidence function like oracles (Chase,
pp. 39-43). He notes that the application of reason to observable facts
reflects “methods of science that have dominated Western thought
since the end of the Middle Ages” (Chase, p. 41). Yet, this seeming
scientific rationality is undermined in every modern legal system by
rules that sacrifice accuracy in favor of other cultural values. Thus,
“[l]egal processes tell the decider how the real must be sorted from
the false” (Chase, p. 42).
Having laid this groundwork, Chase then takes a turn that
differentiates his book from Rosen’s; he draws explicit lessons for law
reform. Most fundamentally, he argues that “[a]ny proposal to
borrow procedures from another society should prompt a cultural
inquiry” (Chase, p. 48). Thus, processes that work in one culture may
fail elsewhere because the processes may reflect deeply held
worldviews. This may be particularly true of dispute processes,
“because they are so public, dramatic, and repetitive.” (Id.) For
example, the oft-noted American reliance on law may reflect core
features of American culture more generally. Chase relies on the
insights of Robert A. Kagan in this regard, arguing that the
American reliance on law arises from an idealistic culture that
demands comprehensive solutions to social problems, while at the
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same time mistrusting government bureaucracy and therefore
demanding that such solutions be reached through decentralized
processes.13 The result, for Kagan, is a reliance on litigation. And
Chase rightly points out that trying to reform this reliance on
adversarial legalism may not “work” because it is so central to
culture.
Of course, observing the tie between law and culture cannot
fully answer the normative law reform question. This is because law
and culture operate in a reflexive loop, each influencing the other.
Accordingly, a change in law may actually change culture over time.
Thus, a legal reform or transplant from another system may be
rejected because of lack of cultural fit, but alternatively it may be
adopted and ultimately come to seem natural, thereby effectuating
broader cultural shifts.
Chase explores these interactive transformations of law and
culture in his explication of the rise of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) processes in the United States. One might think
that given the cultural rationales for adversarial legalism
summarized above, ADR would have difficulty taking root here. Yet,
Chase traces the rise of ADR to a confluence of cultural factors:
“distrust of government, privatization, humanization of large-scale
institutions, social progress through individual improvement, and
postmodern skepticism about an objective reality” (Chase, p. 94).
Thus, ADR is less inexplicable than it might first appear. Moreover,
in true Mobius Strip fashion, the change in legal landscape
inevitably feeds back into an altered cultural conception about how
disputes should be resolved.
Accordingly, while Chase raises normative questions about legal
transplantation, it is not clear how such questions actually cash out.
After all, it is easy to see why transplants will fail if culture is static,
but in Chase’s conception, as noted above, law changes culture just
as much as it reflects it. Thus, a transplant could actually effectuate
cultural change rather than simply being thwarted by cultural
specificity.
To be fair, Chase acknowledges this difficulty. Indeed, in his
conclusion, he explicitly states that a more culturally-sensitive
analysis will not “necessarily dictate a resolution” of debates about
transplants (Chase, p. 139). Instead, he urges only that “the
constructive power of dispute-ways should be on the agenda.” (Id.) As
such, the outcome of any given transplant discussion, according to
Chase, “should depend on an estimate of the cultural clash and
constructive strength of a contemplated new direction and, even
13. See Chase at 49 (quoting ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 15-16 (2001)).
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more important, the desirability of the value that will be served.”
(Id.) This is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes, though it is unclear
exactly how such estimates will be made. In any event, Chase rightly
concludes that seeking technocratic, purportedly pan-cultural,
solutions is unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy. And in
this insight alone Chase advances the discussion a great deal.
*

*

*

Both Rosen and Chase are to be congratulated for ensuring that
an understanding of the deep ties between law and culture always
plays a part in our consideration of the interactions among legal
systems and the melding of legal rules. Such deep ties require,
among other things, that reformers remain cautious and self-aware.
Thus, these two books lay the essential groundwork for future
explorations.
Such future explorations will undoubtedly need to push even
further to the core legal process questions of the twenty-first
century, an era in which both law and culture are likely to become
increasingly polyglot. As communication technologies, trade, and
migration blur cultural boundaries and even begin to undermine
relatively stable ideas about the majority religious, racial, and ethnic
groupings that comprise a state, law will face greater pressure to
incorporate foreign cultural practices. Yet, at the same time, there
are bound to be backlashes, as cultures fight fiercely to retain their
dispute resolution mechanisms and legal cosmology just as surely as
they resist other perceived encroachments.
Negotiating this complex interplay between cultural bricolage
and cultural essentialism is bound to be the crucial question for
comparative law in this new era. We will need to develop a
jurisprudence for an increasingly hybrid world where cultural
conceptions remain crucial, but are in flux.14 In the end neither book
offers much of a roadmap with regard to this sort of jurisprudence.
To be fair, this is not Rosen’s project at all, and to the extent Chase
addresses the question, his analysis is meant to be only an initial
foray. Thus, these useful books point the way for subsequent
analyses, even while stopping short of tackling the core future issues
of law and globalization themselves.
In the end, both books are readily accessible introductions to the
cultural analysis of law, and comparative lawyers will find much
food for thought. And if these books still leave some of the big
14. For my own preliminary stab at such a jurisprudence, see Berman, supra
note 8; see also PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, LAW BEYOND BORDERS: JURISPRUDENCE FOR A
HYBRID WORLD (forthcoming, Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (expanding on this idea).
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questions of legal/cultural change unresolved, we will certainly not
be able to take the next step without heeding the insights they
contain. Thus, as we move into a world of increasing legal pluralism
and hybridity, Rosen and Chase have laid down important markers
to which we should keep returning as we traverse the uncertain road
ahead.

